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ABSTRACT
Feature squeezing is a recently-introduced framework for miti-
gating and detecting adversarial examples. In previous work, we
showed that it is effective against several earlier methods for gener-
ating adversarial examples. In this short note, we report on recent
results showing that simple feature squeezing techniques also make
deep learning models significantly more robust against the Car-
lini/Wagner attacks, which are the best known adversarial methods
discovered to date.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Adversarial examples are inputs crafted by an adversary to fool a
machine learning system. Many techniques for generating adver-
sarial examples have been proposed, and nearly all of these perform
some kind of algorithmic search starting from a seed sample with
the aim of finding a misclassified example within a distance (accord-
ing to a given distance metric) limited by an adversarial strength
parameter [3, 6, 7, 9].
Feature squeezing is a general method for mitigating and detect-
ing adversarial examples against machine learning models [10]. It
reduces the search space available to an adversary by coalescing
samples that correspond to many different feature vectors in the
original space into a single sample. Feature squeezing is an inexpen-
sive pre-processing technique that can be used with any classifica-
tion model, so it is orthogonal to other model hardening methods.
The main idea of feature squeezing is to compare the model’s pre-
dictions on both the input sample and a squeezed version of that
input sample. For normal samples, with a suitable feature squeezer,
both predictions should be very similar; for adversarial examples,
the predictions will differ substantially.
Previously, Xu et al. [10] found two simple feature squeezing
methods (bit depth reduction and median smoothing) to be ex-
tremely effective in mitigating and detecting the adversarial ex-
amples generated by Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [3] and
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) [7]. In this short
note, we evaluate a simple feature squeezing defense against three
state-of-the-art adversarial techniques proposed recently by Carlini
and Wagner [2]. Our experimental results on both the MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets show that feature squeezing reduces the success
rate of targeted attacks from nearly 100% to below 6% (Table 1).
In addition, feature squeezing can effectively detect adversarial
examples generated by the Carlini/Wagner methods with 98.80%
accuracy on MNIST and 87.50% on CIFAR-10.
We next introduce the threat model and the feature squeezer we
used. Section 3 evaluates the robustness of deep learning models
enhanced with feature squeezing, and Section 4 reports on our
detection experiments.
2 BACKGROUND
Carlini and Wagner recently introduced three new gradient-based
attack algorithms (L2, L∞ and L0) that are more effective than all
previously known methods in terms of the adversarial success rates
achieved with minimal perturbation amounts [2]. Their L2 attack
uses a logits-based objective function which is different from all
existing L2 attacks, and avoids the box constraint by changing
variables. Their L∞ and L0 are based on the L2 attack and tailored
to different distance metrics.
2.1 Threat Model
We assume an adversary who has full knowledge of a target model
but no ability to influence the model. The adversary’s goal is to
generate adversarial examples that are misclassified (an untargeted
attack) or that are classified into a particular class (targeted attack).
We use the Carlini and Wagner attack algorithms to generate ad-
versarial examples against the target model. In our evaluation, those
adversarial examples are squeezed before being fed to the target
model. We do not consider an adversary that adapts to the feature
squeezing defense. Such adaptation is an area for further research,
but appears to be non-trivial, at least when feature squeezing is
used in the proposed detection framework.
2.2 Feature Squeezer
There exists many possible feature squeezers in the image space,
and both color depth reduction and median smoothing were used in
previous work [10]. This short paper focuses on median smoothing
with a 2×2 window, because our preliminary results indicated that
it is almost always the best squeezer in mitigating Carlini/Wagner
adversarial examples.
There are several possible approaches to implement median
smoothing with a window size of even numbers. We use the SciPy
implementation [8] where the center pixel is always located in the
lower right of the 2×2 sliding window. When there are two equal
median values (two of the pixels have value x1, and the other two
values have value x2), the resulting median value is the larger one
(max(x1,x2)). Pixels on the edge are padded in the reflect mode as
needed.
3 ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION
We evaluate all three attack methods, L2, L∞ and L0 proposed by
Carlini and Wagner [2], in both untargeted and targeted variations.
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Table 1: Robustness results for feature squeezing using median smoothing with 2×2 window. (The first 1000 testing images from
each dataset were used in evaluation.)
Dataset Carlini’sAttack
Targeted Attack Untargeted Attack
Adversary
Success Rate
Accuracy on
Adversarial Examples
Accuracy on
Adversarial Examples
Original Squeezed Original Squeezed Original Squeezed
MNIST
L2 0.999 0.022 0.001 0.879 0 0.904
L∞ 1 0.011 0 0.936 0 0.942
L0 1 0.057 0 0.758 0 0.817
CIFAR-10
L2 1 0.033 0 0.672 0 0.682
L∞ 1 0.037 0 0.670 0 0.661
L0 1 0.028 0 0.702 0 0.706
There are are the most effective adversarial methods found to date.
Our defense does not depend on the details of these methods. We
note, though, that part of their effectiveness, as measured by the
goal of changing as little about the input as possible to achieve
the adversary goal of changing the class, is what makes the simple
feature squeezing defense so effective against them.
3.1 Experimental Design
We use two datasets, MNIST [5] (28×28 gray scale images of hand-
written digits) and CIFAR-10 [4] (32×32 color photos of objects) for
the experiment. These are the same datasets used in Carlini et al.’s
evaluation [2].
Two target models respectively for the two datasets were trained
with Carlini’s code [1]. We adopted all the default parameters for
the three attack methods, except that we changed the maximum
iterations of L2 attack from 10,000 to 1000 for consistency with
other two methods. We only used the first 1000 testing images in
each dataset for generating adversarial examples due to the high
computational cost of their methods (around 2 minutes per sample
for L∞ and L0). For each of these images, we generated six different
adversarial examples for each image to evaluate the robustness, as
there were three different attack methods in two modes (untargeted
and targeted).
3.2 Results
For both targeted and untargeted attacks, we compare the accuracy
on adversarial examples between the original model and the one
enhanced with feature squeezing. We also compare the adversary
success rate for targeted attacks. The target class is selected by
(l + 1) mod #class, where l is the ground truth class. The success
rate of a targeted attack is defined as the proportion of adversarial
examples being misclassified as the targeted class.
Table 1 summarizes the results. Feature squeezing using 2×2
median smoothing,barely affects the accuracy on legitimate exam-
ples (99.5% to 99.4%) for MNIST, and preserves 93.2% of the original
accuracy for CIFAR-10 (73.0% versus 78.3%). But, it dramatically im-
proves the robustness of the two models, reducing the adversary’s
success rate for targeted attacks from nearly 100% to below 6% for
all three attack methods on both datasets. Our defense increases
the accuracy on adversarial examples from 0% to at least 81% on
MINST and over 66% on CIFAR-10 for all the untargeted attacks,
which are over 80% of the original accuracy results on legitimate
inputs for both models.
4 DETECTING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Feature squeezing is most effectively used to detect adversarial
examples. Using it outside of this framework (that is, just using the
output of the classifier on the squeezed input) risks presenting ad-
versaries with new exploit opportunities. The detection framework
compares the difference of predictions between an original input
and the squeezed version. The score of each input x is computed in
L1 norm:
score = |д(x) − д(squeeze(x))|1
Our intuition is that legitimate examples should have low scores
since feature squeezing methods should not to change normal in-
puts in ways that impact classification. On the other hand, an adver-
sarial example might look dramatically different to a target model
with feature squeezing, resulting a large score.
4.1 Experimental Design
The detection experiment uses the same design and datasets as the
robustness experiments. We used the adversarial examples from
the previous experiment (Section 3.1), where each of the first 1,000
legitimate examples was associated with six different adversarial
examples. In order to get a balanced dataset for evaluating the
detection performance, we used the first 6,000 testing images from
each dataset as legitimate samples, resulting in 12,000 images in
total. We split the images into two parts: one half as the training set
and the rest as the validation set. We selected a threshold value that
maximized the detection accuracy on the training set, and report
the detection performance measured on the validation set.
4.2 Results
Table 2 summarizes the results. The ROC-AUC score of 0.9950
indicates that we obtain a nearly perfect detector on the MNIST
dataset. By selecting 0.1147 as the threshold, we get a detection
accuracy of 98.80% while the true positive rate is 99.30% and the
false positive rate is 1.73%. The actual threshold used by a model
operator could be different, depending on the desired trade-off
between the false negatives and the false positives.
The detection performance on CIFAR-10 is worse than that on
MNIST, where the ROC-AUC score on the validation set is 0.8711
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Table 2: Detection results. The threshold is selected to maximize the detection accuracy on the training set. All the reported metrics are
generated from the validation set.
Dataset Validated Detection PerformanceROC-AUC Threshold Accuracy TPR FPR
MNIST 0.9950 0.1147 0.9880 0.9933 0.0173
CIFAR-10 0.8711 0.7423 0.8750 0.9527 0.2027
(compared to 0.9950 on MNIST). We believe that is because the
target CIFAR-10 model doesn’t have state-of-the-art classification
accuracy. Considering the poor accuracy of 78.3% on the first 1000
legitimate examples, the model actually outputs unstable predic-
tions for many legitimate images. As a result, the L1 score could be
unusually large with feature squeezing, making it more difficult to
distinguish from adversarial examples.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Adversarial machine learning is an emerging research area, where
our current understanding is mostly limited to empirical results.
The experimental success of very simple feature squeezing defenses
against complicated adversarial methods does not mean that effec-
tive adversarial methods do not exist. Instead, it means we need to
rethink the formal definition of an adversarial example and develop
a stronger theoretical understanding of the behavior of machine
learning models and potential adversaries.
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